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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last several years unprecedented public attention has focused on insider
trading. While intensified law enforcement has made insider trading riskier than ever,
the temptations are substantial. Takeover bids generate large price changes, bankable
for those with advance knowledge; options purchases can multiply profits even from
information indicating modest price changes.
The wave of major insider trading prosecutions has been taken by many as a
symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street. The federal securities laws, which
already provide extra civil penalties for insider trading that are not applicable to more
overt types of fraud, may be amended to increase criminal penalties.1 Other
legislation is pending to define insider trading, a practice currently prosecuted under
general antifraud statutes. 2
The purpose of this Article is to look behind this furor and examine the reasons
why insider trading is considered wrong, describe the influence of these different
considerations on the development of insider trading law, and, in light of them, to
analyze pending proposals to define insider trading.
Unlike much of securities regulation, insider trading restrictions are not limited
to securities professionals or to the securities issuers who rely on public markets for
their financing. Unlike much securities regulation, insider trading rules probably do
not result in more information coming into the market: the "abstain or disclose" rule
for those entrusted with confidential information usually is observed by abstention.
Nonetheless, suppression of insider trading is increasingly considered a vital point of
securities regulation.
Arguments against insider trading tend either to have an economic emphasis or
a moral one-issues of efficiency (wealth increases) or fairness (wealth transfers).
The economic arguments against insider trading are inconclusive. The contention that
the existence of insider trading will cause investors to desert the securities markets is
doubtful and certainly unproven. Arguments concerning the effect of insider trading
on pricing efficiency and corporate welfare cut both ways.
The more important argument against insider trading is that it is unfair, either in
the sense that it is dishonest or in the sense that it simply does not allow everyone an
equal opportunity to profit. The development of insider trading law has reflected a
* Ph.D., 1975, A.M., 1970, University of Chicago; B.A., 1967, University of Washington. Mr. Cox has been
a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission since 1983. The views expressed herein are those of Commissioner
Cox and Mr. Fogarty and do not necessarily represent those of the Commission, other Commissioners, or the Commission
staff.
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1. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 14 (1987) (authorizing criminal fines of $1,000,000 and ten year prison
terms for insider trading).
2. See infra section VI.
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tension between traditional principles of fraud and fiduciary duty on the one hand and
a more general desire to provide equal access to material information and economic
opportunity on the other.
The case law has arrived at a rule that respects the former notions in principle
while serving the latter goal in effect. The safest course remains not to trade while in
possession of material nonpublic information, although the actual law and recent
attempts to codify it are considerably more subtle than this.
Before looking at the multiple fairness notions that have influenced the law, we
will briefly consider some of the economic arguments raised against insider trading.
For purposes of the economic discussion, we will define "inside information"
broadly as material, nonpublic information, as the economic discussions usually do.
II. EcoNoMic CONSIDERAIONS
Perhaps the economic arguiment most frequently invoked (though not often by
economists) against insider trading is that investors will desert the securities markets
if they believe other market participants hold an unfair informational advantage. The
argument is plausible but has never been systematically studied. Nor has it been
confirmed by casual observation. We do not know how investors would react to a
market where insider trading was entirely open and widespread; however, stock
markets functioned successfully-whether or not optimally we cannot say-long
before insider trading prosecutions became as common as they have in the last
twenty-five years.3 Markets appear to function successfully in nations where official
attitudes toward insider trading traditionally have been more benign than in the
United States. 4 Moreover, the highly publicized insider trading prosecutions of 1986,
including the Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky cases, although widely interpreted as
evidence of pervasive insider trading, seemed to have had no substantial long-term
impact on investment in securities, which continued to increase.5 While the market
crash of October 1987 has been attributed to a number of factors, disillusionment over
insider trading has not been prominently mentioned. When and if investors desert the
market, it will likely be for reasons having little to do with insider trading. Finally,
the argument that investors would desert a market perceived as unfair seems to
assume that alternative investments exist in markets where information is more
readily available and evenly distributed and which have the tremendous liquidity and
3. From 1981 through 1986, the SEC brought 129 insider trading cases, compared to 77 in the preceding 47 years.
Statement of SEC Chairman John Shad before Securities Subcomm. of Sen. Banking Comm. at 8 (May 13, 1987). The
1961 decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 33-37,
while hardly the first insider trading case, is in some respects the font of modem insider trading theory.
4. E.g., Japan. See So Many Misunderstandings, THE EcoNomrms (Oct. 10, 1987) at 78, describing Japanese
attitudes toward insider trading. By some measures the Tokyo Stock Exchange is the largest securities market on earth.
See Gumbel, Japan Stock Mkt. Overtakes the U.S. As World's Largest, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 12, col. 3.
5. The Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 1873.59 before the Boesky case was announced, closed at 1860.52
the next business day, at 1893.56 after a week, at 1922.81 after a month, and at 2325.49 after six months. See the Dow
Jones Industrial Averages for Nov. 14, Nov. 17, Nov. 21, and Dec. 15, 1986, and May 14, 1987, available in the 1986
and 1987 Wall St. J. Index. Most people believed insider trading was common even before that case. See Wall St. J., June
6, 1986, at 3, col. 4 (poll reporting two out of three adults believed insider trading was common, and even more investors
did). Moreover, if insider trading were regarded as legitimate, rather than prosecuted and publicized as scandal, it is
possible that, for a given amount of insider trading, the damage to public confidence would be less.
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related advantages of the securities markets. Market desertion should be a matter of
particular concern to the stock exchanges themselves. It would be interesting to study
to what extent the exchanges have undertaken, on their own initiative rather than
under government pressure, efforts to prevent insider trading, including "front-
running" transactions made by securities firms in anticipation of the price impact of
customer orders. At the same time, any conclusions would have to consider whether
regulatory efforts would be worth the trouble for an exchange, given its limited
policing powers. 6
A second argument turns on pricing. There is some agreement that allocation of
resources will become more efficient the more share prices reflect information
relevant to their value. 7 Research and analysis promote these objectives, but insider
trading may discourage such activity by sending false signals to the market. For
example, the analyst who buys because publicly available information indicates he
has spotted a bargain may turn out to be a chump if the low price was simply the
result of insiders selling on undisclosed bad news. 8 However, may not the same effect
on price result from sales by traders who possess unique insights rather than unique
information? In any case, insider transactions, at least to the extent not offset by
traders seizing the false bargain, have moved the price in the correct direction and
helped to satisfy the expectations of those traders relying neither on inside
information nor fake bargains but on the general efficiency of the market in gauging
value. Indeed, if anything is likely to frustrate the efforts of researchers and analysts,
it is that this general efficiency, even apart from the machinations of insiders, makes
it quite difficult to "beat" the market. Still, the industry of securities analysis
endures.
Moreover, the efforts of analysts and researchers are arguably chilled by the
existence of insider trading prohibitions. Analysts seek as much information as they
can glean as soon as they can glean it; their efforts to bring such information to
markets and prices occur because of the obvious financial incentives. A prohibition
that discourages use of information other than that already discovered necessarily
discourages the discovery of new information and inhibits the use of information
whose public or nonpublic status is uncertain. Prohibitions on "tipping" may inhibit
even the discussion of matters important to investors but withheld by a corporate
issuer.9
Few believe that a rule requiring the possessor of inside information to disclose
or abstain from trading results in more disclosure than abstention. But it has been
proposed that the possibility of insider trading discourages insiders from making
prompt disclosure to the general market, with attendant improvements in pricing
6. A parallel argument concerning enforcement efforts by the corporation itself is discussed infra text
accompanying note 15. See also infra text accompanying note 79.
7. See, e.g., H. MANN, INsmER TRADNG AND THE STOCK MARKEr 47-110 (1966) (opposing insider trading laws);
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HIv. L. REv. 322,
341 (1979) (supporting insider trading laws).
8. See, e.g., Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. Rev. 470, 475-76 (1969).
9. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 43-45 (discovery of fraud
within the corporation).
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efficiency. 10 This argument, however, is inapplicable when the trading insiders are
not in a position to determine the timing of disclosure and is of diminished force when
the traders are "tippees." In addition, price continuity, ordinarily considered
desirable, is less likely when the impact of information is concentrated at the point of
its official release, whenever made.
Another price related argument is that manipulated price run-ups may be more
readily recognized if not justified by publicly available information and if the investor
can be reasonably confident that trading is not based on nonpublic information.
However, legal prohibitions can no more assure the absence of insider trading than
of manipulation, and an investor would have no reason to assume he has identified
illegal manipulation rather than illegal insider trading.
A third type of argument focuses on the harm insider trading may do to the
corporation itself. Insofar as investors fear being victimized by insider traders, they
may demand a risk discount for shares they purchase, and to that extent reduce the
amount the corporation can raise when it issues shares." One might also argue that
any corporate loss ascribable to the risk discount, insofar as it is captured by corporate
employees who trade, can be regarded as compensation and as no more alarming than
high executive salaries or perquisites, or any other incentive in a manager's or
employee's compensation package. 12 The compensation argument has no applica-
tion, of course, to persons unrelated to the issuer or its insiders who may nonetheless
have acquired material, nonpublic information. And, there are reasons to question the
efficiency of this form of compensation, 13 which is both difficult to monitor and
presents a particular "moral hazard" in that insiders can profit as much by harming
the corporation and selling short as by improving it and buying. 14 If it were otherwise
10. Mendelson, supra note 8, at 476-77, 489. But see Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66
VA. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1980).
11. Several studies have suggested a correlation between insider trading and the bid/ask spreads of market makers.
See, e.g., Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FiN. ECON. 189 (1986); Copeland &
Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FiN. 1457 (1983). To the extent market makers' inventories are
larger because they purchased from insiders who knew nonpublic bad news, or smaller because they sold to insiders who
knew nonpublic good news, market makers will lose money, and, according to this theory, increase their spreads to recoup
it, since they can never know when they are dealing with an insider. The risk premium thus charged on all transactions
renders shares less valuable and may ultimately affect the original price available to the issuing corporation.
12. See H. MANNE, supra note 7, at 131-46; Carlton & Fisehel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
Rav. 857 (1983). It is argued, for example, that corporations would historically have shown more interest in restricting
insider trading if it were harmful to the company. See id. at 866; Dooley, supra note 10, at 44-47. Even without
purporting to know the historical record in this matter, however, one might still assume that some role was played by the
practical difficulty of undertaking policing efforts whose effectiveness would justify their cost, by the willingness of
public authorities to assume some of this burden, and by the imperfect identity of interests between managers and the
corporation. If such factors played no role, we would at least expect to see corporate efforts to curb the "moral hazard"
trading described below.
13. See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. I.ErAL SruD. 801, 808 (1980);
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT.
Rav. 309, 332-34 (1981). While the possibility of insider trading on corporate "good news" may encourage executives
to produce more good results to announce, the same incentive can be achieved less dangerously by compensating
executives with stock options or with salary increases tied to stock prices. In fact, most major corporations do employ such
incentives. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 540,
558-62 (1984).
14. It has been argued that the same risk is presented by outsiders, such as critical suppliers or customers, who
might be in a position to short the stock and stiff the company. See Carlton & Fisehel, supra note 12, at 874-75. It may
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feasible to regulate insider trading compensation by contract, however, the "moral
hazard" could be eliminated by a contract that simply forbids selling on bad news.
Reversing the argument that trading by insiders can bring to market valuable
clues as to the fortunes of the corporation, it has also been argued that such clues
could harm the corporation, which might have legitimate business reasons for
keeping business information confidential.15 It is the rare circumstance, however, in
which a price change per se, or even open trading by insiders, could provide
information sufficiently concrete to be of use to, for example, competitors, or anyone
other than creditors, investors or financiers of some type. As to the latter groups, it
is not clear why there should be less social utility in informing them than in protecting
the corporation.
Overall, it cannot conclusively be said that the economic benefits outweigh the
costs of prohibiting insider trading. The comparative costs and benefits have not been
quantified. Arguments on both sides make plausible points as to how rational
investors or markets might react to the pressure or possibility of insider trading, but
it is more difficult to establish how in fact they do react and whether, balanced against
countervailing reactions, it really makes much difference. In the abstract, it seems
plausible that insofar as insider trading actually is inefficient it will be prohibited
contractually, whether by corporate charter, employment contract, or stock exchange
rule. The market does not ordinarily grant persons things of value without exacting
a price. Those with access, at least with systematic access, to valuable information
could be expected either to give up something else in return (e.g., take a lower salary,
in the executive compensation hypothetical), in which case they really have no
special advantage, or be forbidden to use the information, at least if this prohibition
is enforceable. If the government's role is confined to enforcing and/or policing such
obligations, the economic question may simply be how the government can know
when its enforcement efforts are costing more than they are worth.
It is obvious, however, that the indignation insider trading arouses does not stem
from calculations of economic efficiency. Rather it is the notion of fairness that
brought insider trading prohibitions into our law, and that is what will keep them
there. What we pay for enforcing public prohibitions against insider trading, for
surveillance, litigation, private compliance efforts, as well as what we pay in pricing
efficiency or other economic costs, are the price we pay for justice. The question is
not so much whether insider trading augments or diminishes society's net wealth, but
whether it allocates wealth to those fairly entitled to it. However, the form insider
trading prohibitions should take depends upon what one's idea of fairness comprises.
also be true, however, that outsiders are less likely to be in such a position and when they are, are more likely to be bound
to perform specific contractual requirements.
15. See Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HO'-mA
L. REv. 9 (1984).
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IlI. FARNESS CONSIDERATIONS
It is not completely clear what people believe is fair from the standpoint of
personal morality. Not long after announcement of the Boesky case, a public opinion
poll was published showing that, while most people believed insider trading should
be illegal, most people also would do it themselves if they had the chance. 16 This may
simply be a confession of weakness, but it may also reflect a feeling that such trading
is not really wrong in itself, however desirable its prohibition may be as social policy.
A. Fairness and Affirmative Misconduct
One view of fairness finds a transaction fair if it is what both parties want at the
time, that is, if it is consensual. And it is consensual if there is no duress and no
deceit. Insider trading rarely involves duress, of course; and the inside trader typically
trades in silence, neither expressing nor implying anything untrue about the securities
involved. He may fail to disclose facts that could change the other party's mind, but
it is hard to say that this by itself amounts to what is commonly understood as deceit
or vitiates the consensual nature of the transaction. In the ordinary commercial
transactions of everyday life, probably very few people feel bound to volunteer all
material information. 17 The seller of a house may fail to warn of noisy neighbors, a
salesman is not expected to apprise his customer of what better deals a competitor
might offer, and not many job or loan applicants initiate discussions of the weak
points in their backgrounds. Similarly, transactions conducted on behalf of undis-
closed principals are common and generally deemed legitimate. Is it hypocritical to
hold stock traders to a different standard?
There is, however, a sense in which one who makes no misrepresentations may
nevertheless be considered culpable for another's decision to trade. This is arguably
the case when the first party has in some respect undertaken to look after the interests
of the other, but instead takes advantage of the other's ignorance. In this situation the
trade involves wrongful conduct, in that it violates a relationship of trust and
confidence, and is therefore distinguishable from the case when the better informed
party's only offense is being better informed. For this reason, the corporate insider,
who is given his employment and position of access in order to serve the corporation,
and ultimately the shareholders, may be considered to occupy a different position
from others in the market. This reasoning from fiduciary principles infers a kind of
agreement between insider and shareholder, though one that is rarely spelled out.
Also, there is the idea that valuable information disclosed subject to restrictions
is a species of property, whether or not the restrictions arise from intracorporate
duties. In this analysis the inside trader is a thief, or at least a converter. While
16. Stuart, Business Week/Harris Poll: Outsiders Aren't Upset by Insider Trading, Bus. week, Dec. 8, 1986, at
34. Even of those who said they would not trade on an inside tip, most did not give the "just plain wrong" choice as their
main reason. See also H. MANNE, supra note 7, at 1-2 (arguing insider trading regarded as wrong only relatively recently).
17. Indeed, no less an ethical authority than Thomas Aquinas considered it acceptable for a grain merchant during
a shortage to sell at high prices even while knowing that new supplies were on the way. While St. Thomas did not regard
such conduct as "exceedingly virtuous," neither did he deem it "contrary to justice." T. AQutNAs, SuztaA TmoLooxCA,
PART n1 (second part), Question 77, Art. 3, Objection 4 and Reply (English Dominican trans. 1918).
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information generally is not "owned" by anyone, the law in limited situations
recognizes proprietary rights in valuable information, and recognizes such rights
against the world and not solely against those who have agreed to keep the
information confidential. 18 This additional protection is usually meant to create
incentives for socially useful activity, such as invention. At bottom, therefore, the
property notion is another efficiency argument, except insofar as one may find moral
repugnance not only in permitting a person to profit by his own breach of confidence,
but also in allowing anyone knowingly to exploit another's breach of confidence.
B. Fairness and Equal Access to Information
A broader "fairness" objection to insider trading does not turn upon any
"theft" or breach of trust. Instead, it regards the trade as unfair-and dishonest-
based upon the simple unavailability of inside information to all parties, a point
distinguishing in some degree some of the common transactions mentioned above.
This high standard of honesty may be especially appropriate to impersonal securities
markets in which an elaborate public reporting system has created an expectation that
material information is generally accessible, and in which investors have no
opportunity to inquire of one another as to the possible use or possession of nonpublic
information. 19 When the focus is on a transaction's consensual nature, however,
accessibility seems besides the point: the other party's decision to consent arises from
information of which he is aware, not from information that is merely available to
him. Moreover, in the absence of positive law, how many would feel compelled by
conscience to disclose, for example, their own intentions to make further purchases
that could materially affect prices, even though the knowledge of that intention may
be absolutely inaccessible to others?20
An additional complication in analyzing insider trading as a type of dishonesty-
whether or not affirmative wrongful conduct is required-arises when looking for the
victim. Certainly someone would have held the shares that the insider bought on
undisclosed good news, and someone ends up with those he sells on secret bad news.
But that person is rarely the person whose intermediary meets the insider's
intermediary on the exchange floor. The latter person was already in the market and
probably would have bought or sold even if the insider had abstained. The person
18. See, e.g., infra note 57.
19. See Brudney, supra note 7, at 326-27, arguing the expectations point. It should also be noted, however, that
the law of insider trading is not confined to publicly owned companies filing periodic SEC reports or to transactions on
an exchange. (The Swiss, perhaps in recognition of the possibility of inquiry in face-to-face transactions, are currently
enacting an insider trading law that apparently is limited to transactions on "quoted stocks, or those listed on the...
exchange ... " N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1987, at 40.) Brudney also cites several common law sources finding disclosure
duties in certain situations when information is uniquely available to one party. See Brudney, supra note 7, at 355 n.110.
20. The Williams Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter Exchange Act] requires just such disclosure in situations that may lead
to changes in corporate control. This obligation, however, does not apply to purchases below 5% of shares outstanding
and was added to the law as tender offer, not insider trading, regulation. See Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1982).
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"harmed" by the failure to abstain is not necessarily the person "cheated" by the
failure to disclose.21
Fairness as equal access to information may be seen, then, as more than a
standard of honesty and not as fraud in any traditional sense, but as an attempt to
prevent exploitation of unearned informational advantages, to promote equality of
opportunity in the securities markets, or, more starkly, to transfer wealth from the
informed to the uninformed. In this respect, insider trading is unfair much in the sense
that inheritances, or even good luck, are unfair;22 and an insider trading prohibition
is not so much an antifraud rule as a law against easy money.
A general prohibition on using unearned commercial advantages would be a
hopelessly intrusive and impractical undertaking. This may be less true, however, of
informational advantages in the securities markets, where information is of great and
reasonably determinable value, and where both information and transactions are
closely monitored and sedulously recorded. Here a limited parity of opportunity
seems almost within the government's power to guarantee.
Too much should not be claimed for this type of equality, however. Its greatest
beneficiaries would appear to be market professionals who trade with frequency and
who are the first to learn newly public information23a It has been argued that in fact
this group is the chief source of political pressure for insider trading prohibitions. 24
As to professionals who trade on behalf of public investors, any wealth transfer they
effect still may benefit mainly higher income groups, hardly the most compelling
context for governmental intervention in private economic arrangements.2.
To sum up, what seems to be the question in the ethical discussions of insider
trading is whether trading on material, nonpublic information is generally dishonest,
sometimes dishonest, or not necessarily dishonest but undesirable in that it distributes
income arbitrarily.
21. See Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and
Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1217 (1981) (discussing the individual trades possibly
"induced" or "preempted" by insiders, and the practical impossibility of identifying them).
22. And what should be made of insider nontrading, i.e., the situation in which the insider refrains from a trade
he would otherwise have made but for his learning nonpublic information? Is its prohibition so rarely proposed because
of the impracticality of enforcement? Because, despite its theoretical similarity to insider trading, no one would really feel
guilty doing it? Or beeause it falls to excite feelings of envy?
23. The occassional investor will always be at some type of disadvantage to the professional. Unless he abandons
his regular job to watch the Dow Jones tape all day, the individual investor will still find there are frequent public reports
of material news to which stock prices will adjust before he has had an opportunity to react to, or has even learned of,
the new information. Those who follow the market full time can react immediately, although their trading advantage is
diminished by the fact that announcements of material news are often made after domestic markets have closed or while
exchange trading has been halted.
24. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider
Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 311 (1987).
25. Even the typical "small investor" is probably in the upper stratum of society as a whole. Most families own
no stock, and only among families wth annual incomes above $50,000 are stock investors a majority. Samuelson, A
Perspective on the Stock Market Collapse, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1987, at F1-F2 (citing Federal Reserve figures).
However, many others probably also benefit from stockholdings through pension funds, although much may depend on
whether or not the pension plan calls for payments to fund beneficiaries that vary with fund investment performance.
Pension funds account for over 20% of the shares held in the U.S. See Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market
Mechanisms 11-12 (1988).
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING THEORIES IN FEDERAL CASE LAW
Insider trading is prosecuted under the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. The law on the subject, like general fraud law, has therefore been tied
to a requirement of affirmatively wrongful acts. 26 However, it seems clear that the
desire to create conditions of equal access to information has had a large role in the
development of ever more sensitive standards of "wrongfulness." Courts not only
have found relationships of trust and confidence where they were not previously
thought to exist, they seem also to have accepted the proposition that when an
informational advantage has been dishonestly acquired from one person, it may not
be employed even in trading with a different person. In practical effect, the law now
reflects a kind of composite of the various notions of fairness. In something akin to
the equitable tradition of disgorgement, which disallows profits derived from
wrongdoing even in the absence of a plaintiff who is to be "made whole," insider
trading law prohibits profiting from any informational advantage traceable to
wrongful acts. There is no law of "equal access," but it has been approached by a
law of "honest access."
At the time the Securities Act 27 and the Securities Exchange Act 28 were passed,
classic insider trading-transactions between uninformed shareholders and corporate
officials possessing inside information-was not regarded as fraudulent in most
jurisdictions. The corporate official's fiduciary duties were considered to run to the
corporation as an entity, not to individual shareholders. Even Strong v. Repide, one
of several decisions to the contrary, acknowledged the general rule but found it
inapplicable in the egregious circumstances of that case. 29 Insider trading decisions
under the federal securities laws have nonetheless characterized the relationship
between corporate official and shareholder as one creating affirmative disclosure
duties. The SEC invoked rule 1Ob-5,3 0 its general antifraud rule, in a nondisclosure
case soon after the rule was promulgated, although with little analysis of what
26. Insider trading is usually prosecuted under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1987), thereunder, which define and prohibit "manipulative or deceptive" practices "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Although the SEC's tender offer regulations include rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14c-3 (1987), which prohibits trading with insider information regardless of any deception or special duty to disclose,
the rule is applicable only in tender offer contexts, and its validity, insofar as it goes beyond rule lOb-5, has had no major
court test.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1987).
29. 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (director and majority shareholder, concealing his own identity, acquired plaintiff's
stock while, unknown to plaintiff, corporation was negotiating land sale that would increase value of shares ten times).
Compare Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933) (directors purchasing stock had no duty to disclose
information concerning possible copper deposits on corporate land). See also Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159
P.2d 980 (1945) (discussing "majority" rule permitting insider trading, "special facts" doctrine of Strong, and
"minority" rule requiring insider to disclose to shareholders). Some states, though not all, condemn insider trading as an
abuse of the corporation's proprietary information and require the insider to account to the corporation for any profits. See,
e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co.,
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); RESrATEMENTr (SECOND) or: AGENCY § 388 comment c (1958); but see Freeman v.
Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978). See generally H. HENN & 3. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPoRAoNs § 239 (1983). See
also infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1987).
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circumstances created the duty to disclose.31 Federal court decisions also indicated
insider disclosure duties under rule lOb-5, but not whether such duties could extend
to persons having no special relationship with one another. 32
The modern era in insider trading law opened with the SEC's 1961 decision of
In re Cady, Roberts & Co.33 The case involved a stock broker who began selling after
being tipped by a director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation that the company was
about to reduce its dividend. The decision was important in at least three respects.
First, it stated a rationale for requiring insiders to disclose or abstain from trading:
the existence of a relationship giving access.., to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and ... the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 34
Second, the prohibition was extended beyond the corporate director to his "tippee."
And third, the opinion made clear that the prohibition covered selling as well as
buying.
The two bases the Commission cited for the abstain or disclose rule could
suggest a "wrongfulness" conception of fairness if the "relationship giving access"
is equated with a position of trust and confidence, and the "inherent unfairness"
basis is regarded as inadequate standing alone. However, the opinion does not compel
such a reading. It explicitly noted that its rule was not confined to traditional insiders,
such as officers, directors, and majority shareholders, and it did not argue tippee
liability on the ground that the tippee is merely an accessory after-the-fact to a wrong
really done by the insider-the one having a special relationship with the
shareholders. 35 Finally, the Commission dismissed the contention that since those
who purchased from insiders were not necessarily stockholders theretofore, no
special disclosure duty was owed them.36 Although the Commission gave short shrift
to this argument, it is not clear whether the Commission may have felt that a
relationship of trust also existed as to share purchasers, or whether it simply didn't
matter. 37
31. See In re Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (purchases by issuer itself and by prospective
acquiror while possessing material nonpublic information as to merger plan and profitability).
32. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (purchases by majority shareholder
knowing of undisclosed increase in inventory value); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(officers purchased stock having secretly arranged to sell company; however, affirmative misrepresentations also
involved).
33. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
34. Id. at 912.
35. Id. at 912-13. Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
36. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912.
37. The Commission quoted Learned Hand's opinion in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) (concerning § 16(b) of the Exchange Act) that
the director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a sorry
distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary,
although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become one.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 n.23 (1961). It appears from Gratz, however, that Judge Hand may have
regarded the simple informational advantage as the reason for the rule for fiduciaries. See Grutz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46,
49-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
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At any rate, within a few years some courts had taken the position that the rule
against insider trading "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information .... Thus, anyone in possession of
material insider information must either disclose it . . . or . . . abstain from
trading .... *"38
The Supreme Court, however, moved the law firmly back in the direction of the
wrongfulness notion. Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer, had been
convicted of securities fraud in the southern district of New York based on his
purchases of stock in tender offer targets. Chiarella knew the targets before the public
did because he was involved in printing the offering documents. Although the bidder
and the printing firm that employed Chiarella took measures to prevent any leak of
the targets' identities, Chiarella had been able to circumvent these. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Chiarella's conviction, 39 reasoning that anyone with
regular access to material nonpublic information was obliged to abstain from trading
if he could or would not disclose. The Supreme Court reversed,40 holding that
Chiarella's silence could not be fraudulent absent a duty to disclose and that such
duties arose from specific relationships of trust and confidence, not simply from
regular access to nonpublic information. Since Chiarella had no relationship
whatsoever with the target companies or their shareholders, he owed them no duty to
volunteer information. 41 The Court did not consider the question of whether
Chiarella's duties to his employer or its bidder customers may have been relevant to
a fraud, since it held that theory had not been presented to the jury.42
Three years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed that access to material nonpublic
information did not in itself create a duty to disclose or abstain. In Dirks v. SEC,43
it exonerated Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst who "tipped" his clients and
others who sold stock, after he learned from a former corporate official that the
corporation's books concealed massive fraud. 44 Dirks had no particular duty to
38. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp., 401 F,2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968). This broad
statement may have been dictum in Texas Gulf Sulphur itself since the individual defendants in that case were employees
of the issuer, and thus liable on narrower grounds. The material information concerned a mineral strike on one of the
company's Canadian properties. Compare General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), a decision from the same circuit, in the same year, stating that, subject to the independent
requirements of the Williams Act, rule 1Ob-5 did not require a prospective tender offeror to disclose its material intentions
while making open market purchases. The SEC took a similar position in an amicus curiae submission in Pacific Ins. Co.
v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), Memorandum of SEC, at 5-7.
39. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
40. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
41. Chiarella has been described as an "outsider" trading on "outside" or "market" information. That is, he had
no relationship to the issuers whose stock he bought, and the information he used, though highly material and confidential,
did not originate within the issuer corporations.
42. Id. 236 However, Justice Brennan, concurring, and Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, felt that Chiarella had
defrauded his employer and its customers in connection with his stock purchases. Id. at 238-39 and 239-43. Justice
Stevens, concurring, said the question was open. Id. at 238. Justices Blackmun and Marshall dissented, basically
accepting the Second Circuit's theory. Id. at 251.
43. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
44. Dirks' offense basically derived from discussing what he had learned with clients and investment advisers.
Although Dirks had sought to interest both the SEC and the Wall StreetJournal in his discovery, the information remained
nonpublic until a California state agency took action. See the discussion of tipping infra Section VI.
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buyers in the market, in no way misled them, and therefore could not be held
accountable for instigating sales to them unless in some manner he participated in a
fraud perpetrated by the corporate official. But, the Court held, no personal gain or
benefit to the corporate official had been shown; he had, therefore, not taken
advantage of the shareholders to whom his own special duties ran, and so there was
no wrong in which Dirks could have participated. 45 The tippee's duty, like the
insider's, related not to bare access but to affirmative wrongful conduct.
No longer able to bring cases based solely on access to material, nonpublic
information, the government turned to the "misappropriation theory" adumbrated in
several of the separate opinions in Chiarella. Now a new concept of affirmative
misconduct gained prominence in the insider trading wars, one containing a notion of
information as property, not far different from certain state law decisions regarding
inside information as a corporate asset which is "converted," "stolen," or
"misappropriated" when used for personal gain. 46
Already in 1981 the Second Circuit had adopted the misappropriation theory,
affirming the securities fraud conviction of James Newman, who received and traded
upon information concerning targets of various takeover plans. 47 Newman's confed-
erates were employees of investment banking firms, and the plans were those of the
firms' clients. The court found a fraud against the investment banks and their clients
and held it to be in connection with securities purchases since securities purchases
were the whole point of the fraud.
Other decisions elaborated the requirement that misappropriated information be
received in confidence, not merely be nonpublic, 48 and held that, since the
misappropriator violated his responsibilities to the source of his information and not
to other traders in the market, the latter had no private claim against him. 49
The great test of the misappropriation theory was expected to come in United
States v. Carpenter, the "Winans case." 50 R. Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall
Street Journal, frequently wrote columns for that paper reflecting favorably or poorly
on particular companies. The column had a perceptible impact on the companies'
45. The Court allowed that the requisite benefit to the corporate insider could take many forms, even the ability
to confer an informational "gift" on a favored individual or some valuable enhancement to the insider's own reputation
with his tippee. The record before the Court, however, did not indicate either situation. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
663-64, 667 (1983). The Court also recognized that some persons, though not Dirks, could acquire the duties ofinsiders,
even if they were neither employees of the corporation nor tippees within the rule the Court laid down. These "temporary
insiders" would be people such as attorneys or investment bankers, who received information in confidence from the
corporation and were obligated to it, and through it, to its shareholders in the market, not to trade on the information. See
id. at 655 n. 14. This notion was advanced to somewhat more informal relationships in SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (longtime friend and business associate was solicited to participate in material, nonpublic deal; declined
but purchased stock).
46. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv.
Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
47. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
48. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissed since nonpublic information
imparted not subject to understanding of confidentiality nor provided in course of fiduciary relationship). Cf. SEC v.
Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (personal and business relationship rendered recipient of information a
"temporary insider," even though not a traditional fiduciary and no express confidentiality agreement).
49. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
50. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
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stock prices. Winans and his tippees exploited this impact by buying or selling shortly
before publication, in clear contravention of the Journal's internal rules. On the
theory that the publication schedule was proprietary information of the Journal,
misappropriated by Winans and his friends, they were convicted both of securities
fraud and mail and wire fraud. 5' The Second Circuit upheld the convictions on
grounds similar to those in Newman. 52
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the convictions were upheld again,
unanimously as to mail and wire fraud, and by a 4-4 split on securities fraud. 53
Presumably the split on the securities fraud count was attributable to doubt over
whether the unanimously acknowledged fraud was "in connection with" securities
transactions, as required by the Securities Exchange Act. Nevertheless, one of the
principal objections to the misappropriation theory-that it made employer work
rules into criminal statutes-apparently carried no weight. 54 The notion now is firmly
established that misappropriation of confidential information is a legal fraud, and one
must doubt whether, having gone that far, courts will hesitate to find the requisite
connection to a purchase or sale of securities.
The Supreme Court's heavy emphasis in Carpenter upon confidential informa-
tion as property was indispensable to upholding the mail fraud conviction, since the
mail fraud statute required the Journal to have been deprived of "money or
property." ' 55 The Journal's "contractual right to [Winans'] honest and faithful
service [was] an interest too ethereal in itself to fall within the protection of the mail
fraud statute .... ",56 The notion of a publication schedule as property is a handy one
for thinking about misappropriation, but it is also a somewhat novel application of the
property concept. In most of the cases that Carpenter cites as recognizing property in
information, the idea was to preserve the benefit of the information to the one whose
efforts and resources had been invested in discovering or assembling it.57 That idea
51. It is essential to understanding the theory of the case to realize that Winans was not accused of slanting his
columns to achieve a particular price effect and that the columns themselves contained no information that was material
and previously nonpublic. Knowledge of the articles' purport and the fact that thousands of investors would read them
were the important thing.
52. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). In some passages, the
appellate opinion seemed to suggest that Chiarella had transmuted the "equal access" rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur, into
an "honest access" rule that created some sort of obligation toward other traders. See id. at 1031:
Obviously, one may gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace through conduct constituting skill,
foresight, industry and the like.. . . But one may not gain such an advantage by... secreting, stealing,
purloining or otherwise misappropriating....
The notion of "advantage" relates to other traders, not to the person misappropriated from. See also id. at 1034,
indicating that the securities fraud could be avoided by disclosure of the confidential information. Does this suggest that
the securities fraud is against the other party to the trade, or merely that the fraud against the Journal would no longer
have been "in connection with" the securities transaction had disclosure been made? However, there was no need in a
criminal case to pursue these questions. Compare Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 5 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
53. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
54. This is particularly striking in a newspaper case when a very legitimate concern could arise that liberal
recognition of property rights in confidential information might subject reporters who rely on "leaks" to prosecution for
fraud by misappropriation.
55. See McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
56. 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
57. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984) (trade secrets); International News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (news); Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236
(1905) (commodity price quotations); bursee Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983). Cf. J. LocKE, Two 'ThAnrsEs
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sounds more applicable to the articles themselves-which were already copyrightable
property-than to the publication schedule.
V. MIISAPPROPRIATION: THE Lin oF WRONGFULNESS
The misappropriation theory takes the "wrongfulness" oriented approach to
insider trading about as far as it can go. It is not an entirely satisfactory theory of
securities fraud. The putative victim may himself have no cause of action for
securities fraud, since he will not necessarily have been party to a securities
transaction. 58 Second, the theory's logic could extend not only to informational
advantages but to any trading advantage that can be traced to fraud or breach of
trust. 59 Third, the disclose or abstain rule cannot, of course, apply if there is an
obligation to keep the information confidential. The rule is then to abstain. Finally,
the breach involved may seem trivial in terms of the harm done to the person to whom
the duty is owed, suggesting that the whole theory is merely a pretext for enforcing
equal opportunity in information. 60 At the same time, the theory fails to achieve equal
opportunity: anyone whose informational advantage was not wrongfully obtained
remains free to exploit it. Thus, when Winans committed a felony in trading on his
publisher's confidential information, the publisher might have traded with
impunity. 61
Nonetheless, as a composite reflection of various ideas of right, wrong, honesty,
and equal opportunity, the misappropriation theory has some perverse political kind
of merit. It does require at least some species of affirmative dishonesty before a trader
can be called to account by the government; it does not wholly sacrifice this
libertarian value to an ideal of equal access that arguably is: (a) partly illusory; (b) not
demonstrably in the public interest in terms of additions to net social wealth; and (c)
in any case largely a reshuffling of assets among members of the bourgeoisie. 62
oF GovWRnNmENT, § 27 (J. W. Gough ed. 1946) ("Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided
and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.") cited by the Monsanto Court.
58. This is a prerequisite for standing in a private action under § 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). This would change under legislation proposed by the
SEC. See infra text accompanying note 80.
59. If A and B both want in on a "hot issue," B steals a car, gets to the broker's office before A and buys the last
shares available, has B committed securities fraud? What if he purchases with stolen money?
60. One must seriously question, to say the least, whether R. Foster Winans would have been sent to prison had
he disclosed the Wall Street Journal's publication schedule to the New York Times or some other competitor, instead of
using it to trade securities.
61. The Second Circuit expressly declined to take a position on this question. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024, 1033 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). The SEC's civil case against Winans, settled by a consent
decree, alleged a "scalping" theory in addition to the misappropriation theory alleged in the U.S. Attorney's criminal
action. See SEC v. Brant, No. 84-3470 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1984). "Scalping" occurs when an investment adviser
acquires securities, recommends them without disclosing his interest, and then cashes in on the price increase his
recommendation causes. A scalping charge presupposes a certain confidential relation between the adviser and his readers.
See Capital Gains Research Bureau v. SEC, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). It may reasonably be asked whether the 50 cents readers
pay for the Wall Street Journal establishes such a relationship. Moreover, it is clear only that the scalper must disclose
at the time he advises, not when he buys. If one feels that the problem is the easy money and not the possibility of
prejudiced analysis, then disclosure at the time of publication would be of limited usefulness. There might be a price
impact just the same.
62. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, current insider trading theory, even with its wrongfulness
requirement, covers very much of the ground a straight parity of access rule would
cover, and to that extent serves the public confidence and other benefits claimed for
that approach. Equal access is not an easy thing to define. Victor Brudney's excellent
attempt 63 referred to an informational advantage that could not be overcome by any
lawful efforts on the part of other traders. This, like so many others, is a test of
uncertain application. Brudney would not employ it against the trader whose
exclusive knowledge of his own future plans is material. 64 Moreover, most
informational advantages can be lawfully overcome by making inquiry of the
appropriate people (if only one realized who they were), unless they are under a duty
to hold the information in confidence. Insofar as they are bound by strictures of
confidence, they are covered by current law. 65
Equal access may also be defined simply by whether the material information is
or is not "nonpublic. ' " Obviously, for persons other than reporters, this limits
incentives to bring new information to market. It also is a definition that turns on
differences in degree, rather than in kind; it can become especially difficult with
stocks of small issuers not regularly followed in the financial press; and it can pose
particular problems in possible tipping situations, as the Dirks case illustrated.
Moreover, a trader may not have reason to know the extent to which information he
receives has circulated to others unless he also knows that he or his source has
received the information in confidence. That is to say, as long as scienter-intent-
is a required element of an insider trading offense, we may again be brought back
toward something close to a "wrongfulness" or "honest access" test.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In 1987, widespread concern over insider trading and the acceleration of
criminal prosecutions for this offense revived calls for its clear definition. 67 Two
alternatives emerged. One was recommended by the SEC; the other was proposed by
a group of private securities lawyers, 68 and introduced by Senator Donald Riegle as
S. 1380.69 Both proposals purported to codify current law and to adopt a "wrong-
fulness" approach to defining insider trading, although neither does so entirely.
63. See Brudney, supra note 7.
64. Id. at 362.
65. Brudney's scheme suggests the problem of information also shared by a number of tippees, and to that extent
accessible to still others. Cf. Note, Drawing the Line on Insiders and Outsidersfor Rule 10b-5: Chiarella v. United States,
4 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 203, 230-32 (1981) (asking if information is lawfully available if its possessor is willing to
disclose to anyone for a fee). Brudney does identify one class of case in which his rule is more extensive than a
wrongfulness approach: when a supplier's knowledge of a significant increase in a customer's orders gives it an
informational advantage in trading the customer's stock, or a supplier's customer knows he is about to reject the supplier's
new product and sells the supplier's stock in anticipation. See Brudney, supra note 7, at 359.
66. Information is "nonpublic" if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors
generally. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968); In re Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971).
67. Defining insider trading was also considered prior to passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, but
the SEC advised Congress that a definition was not necessary.
68. This was the Ad Hoc Legislative Committee chaired by Harvey L. Pitt, a former SEC general counsel.
69. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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As revised after efforts at compromise, both proposals forbid trading while in
possession of material, nonpublic information
only if such information has been obtained by, or its use would constitute... theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, espionage[,] . . . conversion, misappropriation[,] . . . breach of a
fiduciary duty[,] . . . relationship of trust and confidence, or . . . any contractual or
employment relationship. 70
Although the definition did not stop with "while in possession of material
nonpublic information," its "wrongfulness" provisions are broad and flexible. 71
However, terms such as "conversion" and "misappropriation" may be read
only so loosely. There is no law indicating that anything can be converted or
misappropriated that is not in some respects proprietary or that information becomes
proprietary simply by virtue of not being generally known. Nor does the fact that
information was transmitted for one purpose necessarily make a "misappropriation"
out of its use for some other purpose, unless the circumstances of its transmittal
indicated an understanding of confidentiality. 72 If something broader, such as a
Brudney-style definition, were meant, statutory references to "wrongfulness" could
only cloud the meaning of the prohibition. The proposed statute would say so if it
intended a straight prohibition on the use of material nonpublic information and the
abandonment of whatever guidance current case law provides as to the meaning of
insider trading.
Both proposals also make express applications of the wrongfulness concept in
transactions when it might not otherwise apply. Thus, trading in debt as well as equity
is covered, even though it is far from clear that insiders are fiduciaries for
debtholders. 73 Such trades may be regarded as misappropriation of corporate
information, 74 but it is harder here than with equity securities to make the case that
trading is a use inconsistent with corporate purposes. At any rate, the explicit
prohibition would settle the question.
Both proposals depart entirely from the wrongfulness requirement on some of
the big-money questions. Thus S. 1380 flatly prohibits tipping one's own intentions
(regardless of any duty or misappropriation) concerning the acquisition or disposition
70. Proposed § 16A(b)(1) to be added to the Securities Exchange Act, reprinted in 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1817 (Nov. 27, 1987) [hereinafter SEC bill]. See also S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
71. One of the drafters of S. 1380 has even characterized it as a bill that "simply interdicts trading in securities
while in possession of material, nonpublic information." Pitt, Winans Case: The Limits of Securities Law, LGAL Tzts,
Nov. 23, 1987, at 19. Clearly, this is an overstatement, or the core of the bill is meaningless. The SEC regards the bill
as continuing the fraud-based approach of current law. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 279, 280 (Feb. 19, 1988)
(reprint of SEC proposed legislative history for insider trading definition) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Legislative History].
72. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Cf. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (personal and business relationship created
"temporary insider" status).
73. See Pittsburgh Terminal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056
(1982) (indicating duty to convertible debt holders). A similar issue arises with respect to options traders. The corporation
ordinarily neither issues nor is a party to exchange-traded options on its stock. The existing statute, however, already
provides that options are included when the underlying security would be. Exchange Act § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d),
added in 1984 as part of the InsiderTrading Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
74. See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (options case
finding misappropriation and decided under law prior to Insider Trading Sanctions Act).
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of an issuer, or transactions in material blocks of stock, if the purpose is to influence
or encourage trading. 75 The SEC proposal incorporates the current rule 14e-3 under
the Securities Exchange Act, 76 which forbids trades made in possession of material
nonpublic information concerning tender offers, (unless made by the tender offeror)
and which also addresses tipping tender offer plans. 77 While this rule is not consistent
with the wrongfulness rationale applied elsewhere, it was a part of the current law the
Commission was attempting to codify and addressed a context in which, to many,
disparity of access seemed unfair enough by itself. 78
To some extent rule 14e-3 may be viewed more as tender offer regulation than
as insider trading regulation. It prevents bidders from giving tips to get stock into the
hands of those believed to be friendly, though not actually part of a "group" whose
holdings would be aggregated for purposes of Williams Act reports; in this respect,
it bolsters the Williams Act requirement to report 5 percent positions.
Despite its theoretical anomaly as an insider trading prohibition, the rule 14e-3
provision covers trading situations involving sums that may dwarf some of those
covered by the "main" trading prohibition. On the other hand, every major case the
SEC has quccessfully brought involving tender offers has been plead under rule
lOb-5, a provision requiring wrongfulness, as well as under rule 14e-3. There is a
great deal of practical overlap.
Outside the tender offer context, the SEC's proposal treats inside information
much as an asset of the firm that generates it, either because (a) as in Carpenter, it
is specifically marked as such and access given to it on that understanding; or (b) it
is material to the fortunes of the firm's own shareholders and, on an extrapolation
from traditional fiduciary principles, is held for their sole benefit. 79
75. An exception is made for persons being solicited to join forces with the "transacting person" and form a group
with him of the type whose holdings above 5% of an issuer must be reported under the Williams Act. Also, trading must
actually occur, with someone other than the transacting person. See S. 1380's proposed § 16A(c)(2), S. 1380, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987).
77. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), and the SEC proposal differ in several other respects, but these are
not directly relevant to the question of wrongfulness.
78. The SEC proposal also applied to trading done in possession of material nonpublic information, rather than to
trading on the basis of such information. The drafters of S. 1380 have also accepted this approach. It may be hard to see
the wrong of trading in the knowledge of facts legitimately received in confidence, if the facts are not actually
"converted" to the possessor's use. The broad possession standard, however, is perhaps best viewed as a prophylactic
one aimed primarily at evidentiary problems. Similarly, the absence of a Dirks-style personal benefit test for insiders who
tip, see supra text accompanying notes 43-45, can be seen as reflecting in some measure a presumption of a personal
benefit (at least on the "gift" theory suggested in Dirks) and in some measure an understanding of inside information as
property committed to the insider's care which he has no right to give away.
79. In both situations implicit understandings are inferred from circumstances. Would it be possible to prevent such
inferences by positive statements to the contrary, such as a statement in a corporate charter that insiders may trade?
Although it is not generally possible to "contract around" the Exchange Act prohibitions, see § 29, 15 U.S.C. 78cc
(1982), this one depends for its initial existence on the violation of standards (theft, bribery, misappropriation, breach of
a fiduciary or employment duty, etc.) external to the Exchange Act. Even though the courts have found, and presumably
would continue to find, corporate duties in insider trading cases that may not have existed under the state law that defined
the relevant corporate relationships, it would be much more difficult to do so in the face of an express ex ante repudiation
of any such duties. Insider trading as compensation might get a tryout after all, although this is highly unlikely for three
reasons. First, "short swing" profits would still be prohibited under the Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982). Second, few firms would have the nerve, even when state law posed no obstacles, to announce such a policy.
Third, if they did so, they could be precluded by securities exchanges. An exchange could declare "no inside
information" an implied term for each contract of purchase or sale consummated through its facilities.It would effectively
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Two other factors should be considered, however. First, proceeds from the use
of the "firm's" property would not be returned to the fim except insofar as it could
prove damages; instead, the proposal contemplates that insider trading profits (or
losses avoided) would go to contemporaneous traders or the government.80 Second,
the "proprietary information" idea supplements but does not replace theories based
on fiduciary or other duties. Thus, in a case like Dirks, trading by the insider himself
could be attacked even though information concerning a fraud could not reasonably
be called proprietary. 81 Still, there is more involved here than the violation of one's
own undertakings or understandings, since the proposed prohibition, like present law,
prevents a tippee from using information obtained in violation of arrangements of
which he has notice but to which he is not a party. This outcome has been more
controversial when tipping rather than trading liability is involved.
Both S. 1380 and the SEC proposal forbid tipping information that the tipper
could not legally use himself.82 How would this rule have applied to the insider in
Dirks? Did he "tip" Dirks?
Moreover, to be liable for tipping, the tipper must understand the nature of the
information he imparts. But it is not clear how far a tipper must realize the nature of
information while he imparts it. What about the executive who inadvertently leaves
a sheaf of sensitive papers in a taxi cab? Could a "slip" be a tip, possibly exposing
the loose-lipped insider to liability for communications that are merely negligent?
Maybe a careless executive who lets a corporate asset roll out of his mouth should be
held liable for the millions of dollars strangers make from it; and perhaps proving a
slip was not a tip could be a formidable evidentiary obstacle for the government or
other plaintiffs. But there are still further questions as the information is transmitted
to others. Is the information made "public" or is it "tipped" if published in an
analyst's report? A newsletter? An obscure magazine? Surely the right to report
information is not reserved to established publications of large circulation.
There was a great deal of consternation over chilling corporate communications
to securities analysts, and the SEC originally proposed a limited "analyst exemp-
tion" to deal with the problem. However, a majority of the Commission subsequently
was persuaded that its concerns could be addressed by providing instead that tipping
bring government enforcement and surveillance powers to bear on behalf of its rule, since any violation would be the
breach of a "contractual relationship" and thus a violation of proposed § 16A(b).
In general, exchanges dissatisfied with the wrongfulness approach of § 16A could expand it through contract.
Appropriate exceptions could be drawn for firms that innocently took customer orders based on inside information, and
customers could be drawn into the contract by having member firms require a representation in their customer agreements
that a trade is not made in possession of or on behalf of one possessing material nonpublic information. Some room for
actual experimentation with insider trading rules might thus be allowed. Cf. Macey, supra note 15, at 9.
80. Proposed § 16A(g). Both the legislative proposals provide express private rights of action against insider
trading, while preserving the government's existing disgorgement remedy. See, e.g., proposed § 16A(g), SEC bill, supra
note 70, at 1818.
81. Cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (distinguishing notion of duty to shareholders from idea of
proprietary information).
82. "It shall be unlawful for any person whose own purchase or sale would violate ... this setion... wrongfully
to communicate information... that such person knows or recklessly disregards is material and nonpublic to any other
person who [trades or tips another whose trade is reasonably foreseeable]." Proposed § 16A(c), SEC bill, supra note 70.
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required not just that one communicate information known to be confidential, but that
one "wrongfully" communicate it.83
This had the equitable advantage of holding conversations between analysts and
executives to the same legal standard as those of ordinary mortals. And it provided
an indication to future courts not to be unduly demanding in judging such
conversations. No one circulating news of a fraud, as Raymond Dirks did, should
find himself liable for tipping simply because trading might be foreseeable by any one
of the numerous persons he alerts. Even in less egregious circumstances, we should
hesitate to threaten people with heavy liability for merely repeating information they
have heard. 84
But at this point it is not entirely clear what the "wrongfulness" requirement for
tipping entails. The proposed provision states that a wrongful communication is only
one where the information was obtained by, or its communication would constitute,
one of the wrongs described in the subsection on trading. Assuming that neither Dirks
nor the insider he spoke with had any responsibility for keeping frauds quiet, the
addition of wrongfulness to the tipping subsection would seem to save them. The
Dirks situation represents a narrow class of cases, however, and it is not obvious that
the addition of a wrongfulness element to tipping insulates the inadvertent tip, or slip,
or prevents small-scale publication from being tagged as tipping.
The Commission has suggested that a tip should be in breach of a duty. 85
However, as analyzed in Dirks, breach of duty may rule out negligence and certainly
excludes any tip not made for the tipper's personal benefit. 86 One of the SEC's
primary aims in proposing legislation, however, was to avoid the personal benefit
test;8 7 and not all the breaches of duty recited in the trading and tipping subsections
83. This language was accepted by both the SEC and the drafters of S. 1380, as was a provision for further
exemption by rule.
84. For example, say a corporate employee tips his grandmother who invests $1,000 and explains to her broker the
reason for what she thinks is a shrewd business move; the broker then quietly invests $6 million. Should the broker
subsequently become insolvent or remove himself from the jurisdiction of the United States, grandmother, whose own
profits were modest, and employee, who had no profit, may be liable to private plaintiffs for the profit on the broker's
$6 million investment. Conceivably the same result could obtain even if grandmother had invested nothing, but, upon
being introduced to a broker at a church social, sought to impress him with her knowledge of confidential corporate
affairs. As noted above, private actions against inside traders and tippers are provided in proposed § 16A(g). See SEC bill,
supra note 70 at 1818. The private rights are provided for the person from whom information is misappropriated, if he
can show damage, and for contemporaneous traders. The latter group will include persons not actually harmed by the
unlawful trade, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. However, given the impracticability of identifying harmed
persons and the desire to deprive the insider and deter the tipper, distributing profits among contemporaneous traders is
at least a solution.
85. Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of SEC, before Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Comm. concerning the Commission's revised proposal to define insider trading, Dee. 15,
1987, at 12 & n.21. Chairman Ruder's testimony indicated that the Commission did not believe the outcome of the Dirks
case would be altered by the Commission's legislative proposal, on the theory that Dirks' tipper (who was disclosing a
fraud) violated no duty. Cf. Macey, supra note 15 (criticizing the Dirks "personal benefit" test and arguing instead for
a "proper subject of contract" test which regards fiduciary obligations as a species of contract and finds Dirks' tipper
could have had no valid contract to conceal a fraud). See also supra note 80.
86. 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
87. It may, however, be impossible to keep the test out, at least in the case involving information about a fraud,
if we wish to allow the insider to tell an analyst but not, for example, his brother-in-law. As to other types of information
that can be more properly characterized as proprietary, the personal benefit test may be dispensed with. Arguably,
legislation may not be necessary to obtain this result, since Dirks, the source of the test, did involve information about
fraud.
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(e.g., breach of a contractual duty) appear to require intent. The consequences of the
tipping provision may thus still appear to some to be draconian. It will be left to the
legislative history of any statute finally adopted to more clearly spell out the
distinction betwen the informational asset which is "wrongfully" passed, and the one
that is just passed.
The Commission's proposed legislative history states that an insider's commu-
nication to an analyst does not create tipping liability unless made in knowing or
reckless disregard of the insider's duty; it goes on to say that when the analyst relays
the information, the analyst will not be liable, assuming he is under no (independent)
duty to hold the information in confidence. 88 It therefore appears that the requirement
of a "wrongful" communication means (1) that generally no liability will attach to
inadvertent communications; (2) that somewhere along the line, someone must have
violated a duty of confidentiality to which he is himself a party; and (3) the violation
must have occurred through knowing or reckless conduct.8 9 Thus both the analyst and
the insider would be protected when there was an inadvertent leak, or a legitimate
attempt to make the information public. If Congress wishes to provide further
protection against "tipper" liability for relatively remote but foreseeable trades, it
would be well-advised to supplement the legislative history proposed. At any rate, the
legislative situation remains in flux, and it is not certain what, if any, statutory
definition will emerge in this session of Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
Prohibitions against insider trading rest basically on notions of honesty and
fairness. These sentiments themselves comprise a multitude of impulses, and insider
trading law has been shaped both by an idea of fraud that requires affirmative
wrongful acts and an ideal of equal informational opportunities. Current law and
pending proposals to codify it retain, with a few significant exceptions, the
requirement of wrongfulness. In so doing, however, they largely accomplish the
results of an equal access-to-information program.
88. See SEC Proposed Legislative History, supra note 71, at 281-82.
89. The proposed legislative history does not expressly address the possibility that an analyst deliberately tricks the
insider into an inadvertent, improper revelation. Liability may still be a possibility there (unless, of course, the analyst
makes the information public prior to any trading); allowing the analyst's scienter to attach to the insider's breach clearly
presents the danger, however, that the most aggressive and effective interrogators could be accused of recklessly inducing
an insider's breach of confidence.
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